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Drug Prohibition and the End of Human Rights: 
 Race, ‘Evil’ and the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 
 
There has been a recent wave of interest in the concurrent but ostensibly contradictory 
histories of drug prohibition and human rights in international law.
1
 The post-World 
War II international legal order was marked by an institutionalisation of global legal 
relations in the form of the United Nations, and two of the most prominent projects 
advanced through this organisation have been the spread of human rights and the 
prohibition of the illegitimate trade of drugs. However, despite sharing a concurrent 
timeline, recent legal scholarship has illustrated the chasm that exists, both practically 
and theoretically, between these twin projects of the UN-era. While the UN presents 
both drug prohibition and human rights as global norms, coherently realisable within 
one holistic legal order, scholars like Rick Lines have highlighted how ‘in practice 
there has been little cross fertilization between the two. The United Nations drug 
control system has rarely considered the human rights impact of the regime and the 
human rights system has rarely considered drug control efforts within its mandate.’
2
 
Moreover, drug prohibition has been identified as actually being a persistent source of 
human rights infringements and a cover for discriminatory treatment of vulnerable 
groups as governments across the world legitimize increasingly strict mechanisms to 
enforce the drug laws.  
The connection between drug prohibition and draconian state power makes the 
contrast between the stated goals of international drug prohibition and international 
human rights even starker. As Lines argues: ‘Human Rights violations linked to drug 
control activities are driven by domestic and/or international efforts to meet the 
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obligations enshrined within the three United Nations drug control conventions’, 
meaning the international drug treaties can themselves be read as implicated in the 
violation of international human rights law.
3
 Upon highlighting this contradiction in 
international law, scholars have tended to argue for drug prohibition to be limited by a 
requirement to comply with human rights demands, with the aim being for the moral 
injunctions of human rights to temper drug prohibition’s tendency towards the 
draconian. For example, Paul Hunt argues that it is imperative that international drug 
prohibition and international human rights ‘cease to behave as though they exist in 
parallel universes. The UN human rights system must give closer attention to the 
international drug conventions, the issue of drug control, and the plight of those who 
use drugs. Equally, the international drug control system must be respectful of human 
rights. This is not an option. It is a legal requirement.
’4
 Hunt maps out how making 
drug prohibition comply with the right to health initiatives, for instance, could lead to 
harm reduction on a global scale.
5
 Yet whilst the contradictions between the aims of 
international human rights and the consequences of international drug prohibition are 
as stark as above scholars crucially identify, a complication can be added to the 
presumption of these two great projects of post-war international law as operating in 
parallel universes. A question that is as-yet overlooked in the literature on drug 
prohibition and human rights is whether these projects share anything more 
substantial than concurrent timelines. Is there any shared theoretical ground between 
them, perhaps anchored in the presuppositions of the post-war birth of the United 
Nations and the remaking of the global legal order? The answer to this question has 
the potential to add complexity to the problem of drug prohibition and human rights 
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operating in ‘parallel universes.’ Would ensuring drug prohibition complies with 
human rights be enough to tame the harms caused by enforcement? What if some of 
the most potent critiques of the drug war, for example that it is Euro-centric, 
disproportionately imposed upon the Global South and infused with a latent Christian 
moralism, had also been levelled at human rights?
6
 The following sections of this 
chapter will look at the critical scholarship written on drug policy and human rights 
and argue for an understanding of the political theology that underwrites both projects 
as they have developed under the UN.  
 
Drug Prohibition in the ‘Age of Human Rights’ 
Upendra Baxi famously described the latter-half of the twentieth century as the ‘Age 
of Human Rights.’
7
 With this phrase, Baxi sought to capture how under the auspices 
of UN, ‘human Rights languages steadily supplant all other ethical notions’ as every 
global project and movement is determined in accordance with an ability to engender 
human rights.’
8
 However, as scholars of human rights and drug policy have noted, the 
project of drug prohibition has often been at odds with the vision of human rights 
although the two co-exist within the same international legislative framework. Neil 
Boister argues that, with their insistence on prohibition over health and wellbeing, 
‘the drug conventions fail to adequately protect the human rights of those individuals 
subject to the system.’
9
 As David Bewley-Taylor details, whereas human rights law 
aims at the protection of marginalized and vulnerable groups, drug laws have 
facilitated the criminalization and isolation of these same groups. Drug laws have 
served as justification for over-policing and brutal law enforcement strategies that 
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 4 
disproportionately impact racial minorities; for restricting access to controlled 
medicine and medical-care for those in need; for restricting the rights of refugees and 
migrants; for using excessive modes of punishment, including arbitrary detention and 
the death penalty; and for causing environmental damage through crop eradication 
policies.
10
 The drug conventions differ from the general trend of UN treaties in that 
they largely ignore the question of human rights. The only brief reference to human 
rights made across the three major UN drug treaties is in article 14 (2) of the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988.
11
 Recently there have been some steps made by the UN human 
rights apparatus towards measuring drug prohibition using the standards of human 
rights. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay recognized that 
‘Individuals who use drugs do not forfeit their human rights’, whilst calling for a 
focus on human rights and harm reduction in international drug policy.
12
 However, 
the most common approach remains seeing international law’s project of drug 
prohibition as distinct from international law’s project of spreading and promoting 
human rights. Each year, the distinction between the two projects is rendered most 
acute on June 26
th,
 as this date serves as both the UN International Day against Drug 
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and the UN International Day in Support of Victims of 
Torture. Remarkably, the UN is able to have drug prohibition and victims of torture 
share the same commemorative date despite the extensive accounts of law 
enforcement officials using torture and indefinite detention as tactics against drug 
traffickers and so-called “rehabilitation” centres using physical abuse, shackles, 
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solitary confinement, and forced labour as tactics to treat drug addicts.
13
  
How do we begin to explain the contradiction between drug prohibition and 
human rights in the UN-era, which is rendered naked every 26
th
 of June? Has the 
international legal apparatus merely overlooked the ways in which drug prohibition 
facilitates breaches of human rights? Or could it be the case that drug prohibition has 
been implicitly assumed to be a complement to the project of human rights, in that it 
claims to produce the autonomous human, who can then subsequently insist of their 
rights? The idea that drug prohibition actually aids human rights is reliant upon a 
perception of drugs themselves being a greater threat to human rights than the effects 
of prohibition; this perception of drugs as leading to individual, human degradation 
and the breakdown of social cohesion, is also one that is championed by 
prohibitionists. This vision is reflected in a 2009 statement by Professor Hamid 
Ghodse, President of the International Narcotics Control Board, who argued that 
‘drug abuse is often in conflict with the due recognition of rights and freedoms of 
others and in meeting the requirements of health, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society.’
14
 Ghodse’s reading of a complementary modus operandi 
between drug prohibition and human rights is grounded in the mythology of drugs as 
an inherent, existential threat to social order that has informed international drug 
prohibition since the turn of the twentieth century; however it may provide a clue to 
the narrow conception of the human that has underwritten much of the UN–era human 
rights law, which may, in turn, offer some explanation for why the UN has been 
largely silent on abuse produced through drug prohibition. To explore this line of 
critique further, it is important to engage with the scholarship that has sought to 
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unpack the presuppositions that underwrite modern human rights. 
 
Who is the ‘human’ of human rights? 
As aforementioned, in conventional terms, the triumph of human rights in the latter 
half of the twentieth century was complete. In legislative terms, human rights are to 
be all-encompassing, extending over every area of life. All UN bodies operate under 
the umbrella of a stated commitment to promote ‘universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
15
 However, in recent years, 
legal scholars have begun to question the omnipotence of human rights. Costas 
Douzinas details how orthodox human rights reach their limit at extending to those 
groups whose humanity has historically been rendered contingent. Douzinas 
elaborates by stating:  
 
[F]ormal right, the legal subject’s capacity to will, is theoretically 
limitless. But real people are embedded in the world [where] 
inequalities [...] prevent formal rights from becoming effective. We 





For Douzinas, it is this question of who qualifies as the human of human rights that 
has been overlooked in much of the literature on this topic, how do human rights 
address those who have been constructed as ‘improper men’? Highlighting how 
‘humanity’ has never been a concept that has been applied equally to all people from 
all places, scholars have drawn on a wide array of theoretical but also practical 
sources to show how human rights can be used to exclude as much as include. Take 
for instance one of the traditional discourses for categorising ‘improper men’ – the 
discourse of race – could the post-war triumph of human rights in international law be 
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indebted to a desire to bury the potency that the language of race and sub-humanity 
had gained in the previous epoch of international relations and helped drive the world 
into WWII. However, as one cannot leap from one condition into another, but must 
instead carry traces and lineages from each epoch into the next, scholars have argued 
for a continuum between the language of racialised, idealised humanity and the 
egalitarian discourse of human rights. For instance, Walter Mignolo identifies that 
whilst human rights ‘state that we are all born equal, it doesn’t mention the fact that 
we stop being equal shortly after we are born’ and human rights as conventionally 
conceived take little notice of the geographical and economic inequalities that persist 
across the globe.
17
 Indeed, as Douzinas points out, 'at the heart of humanism, 
humanity remained a strategy of division and classification.’
18
 The language of racial 
classification that informed the widespread acceptance of racism in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century functioned through a hierarchical conception of the human 
condition, with not all peoples being awarded full humanity but some instead 
characterized as sub or non-human. Scholars have connected this to the history of 
human rights, bringing together the eighteenth century celebration of human rights 
through the French and American revolutions with the concurrent systems of slavery 
and colonialism being enacted by those same states.
19
 This tradition of scholarship 
begins to narrow the gap between human rights and drug prohibition as it echoes 
some of the critiques that have been offered of drug prohibition.  
 
Conjoined Twins: Drug Prohibition and Human Rights 
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Scholarship on the history of drug prohibition in international law has regularly 
emphasised a debt owed to imperial and racist assumptions regarding the global 
order.
20
 Drug prohibition emerged as a legitimate international legal project in the 
first half of the twentieth century, a time in which imperial relations within states and 
hierarchies amongst races were still taken as a given. International law had been 
shifting towards greater legislative support for drug prohibition since the 1909 
meeting of the Shanghai Opium commission, with several drug treaties having been 
brought into effect through the League of Nations in the interwar period. However, 
these treaties had been limited in their effectiveness due to the discordance and 
disorganisation that plagued the League and, with the creation of the UN, the 
legislative ground for prohibition would require reinforcement. The UN sought to 
clear the confusion produced through multiple, overlapping League-era drug treaties 
through the creation of a single, comprehensive drug convention. This aim of 
synthesising and consolidating the preceding treaties into one unified instrument sits 
alongside the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 or the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 as an equally ambitious, 
but comparatively under-researched, project of totalising post-war legal ordering. 
Drafting on the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (hereby 
referred to as the Single Convention) commenced in parallel with these other treaties 
in 1948, but it was not until 1961 that an acceptable third draft was ready.
21
 As one of 
the principle organs of the UN, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) called 
for a consolidation of existing drug treaties into a single treaty in 1948. However, the 
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scale of the task is demonstrated by the fact that it would take thirteen years to 
produce the Single Convention. Still the eventual signing of the Single Convention 
brought a conclusion to the piecemeal form that drug prohibition had taken since 1909 
and established it as a grand project of post-war international law, alongside 
international human rights.  
The UN can, and has been, critiqued for continuing to be informed by imperial 
relations that favoured the West against the former colonial world, despite the 
egalitarian claims of this new international legal institution. The Single Convention is 
not immune from these critiques. The categorisation of drugs produced in the 
schedules of the treaty underwrote a system of international control that has 
disproportionately impacted on the peoples of what is now termed the Global South. 
William McAllister details that: 
 
The ‘schedules of control’ outlined by the Single Convention 
discriminated against the interests of producers. Raw materials and 
simple concoctions such as heroin and cocaine suffered under the 
more severe restrictions of schedules I and IV. Certain manufactured 
(primarily codeine-based) narcotics received somewhat more lenient 




The distinction drawn between plant-based or raw drugs and ‘manufactured’ narcotics 
parallels the distinction between raw materials and added-value commodities that 
economists and dependency theorists have read into the uneven nature of the post-
world economic order, even arguing for these economic structures to be understood as 
an alternative means of imperialism.
23
 Moreover, the requirement that the Single 
Convention placed upon producing countries to centralise and then eradicate drug 
cultivation, production and consumption ensured that they would be carrying the 
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heaviest burden when it came to realising the treaty’s aims.
24
 This privileging of 
Western interests in the supposedly neutral treaty is highlighted by scholars like 
David Bewley-Taylor, who argues that ‘US dominance in the UN control system 
ensured that the Single Convention created a Western-orientated prohibitive 
framework for international drug control.’
25
 Yet a key insight to theoretical biases of 
the Single Convention may be offered not in the main body of the treaty but in the 
preamble and it is the wording of the preamble that will occupy my focus for the 
remainder of this chapter. The emphasis I place on the language of the preamble 
follows the Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, which determines that when 
interpreting international treaties, the preamble must hold significant weight on top of 




The Spectre of Evil in the Single Convention 
A close reading of the preamble shows the full significance of interpreting and 
understanding the provisions of the Single Convention through it. Undertaking such a 
close reading of the language of the law follows in the wake of a notable linguistic 
turn in critical legal studies in recent decades.
27
 With key engagements with 
technologies of language such as semiotics, hermeneutics and deconstruction, legal 
scholarship has advanced the idea that if the law indeed does contain, in both senses 
of the word, the violence of the society within it, then that violence will be notably 
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present upon the body of the law, i.e. the text of the treaties, statues and judicial 
decisions. Particular attention is drawn to the section stating: 
 
Addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the 
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to 
mankind.  
 
Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil, [the parties 




The reference to the concept of ‘evil’ within this international legal treaty appears to 
illustrate the extent to which drug policy runs counter to the historical trend of 
international law. Law functions through the presumed relegation of the theological 
onto the/a mystic past, now overcome through a secular turn to modernity. Law is 
taken to constitute its authority through determinate sovereign power, as positivists 
would claim, or perhaps through an anchoring of a greater sociality, according to 
utilitarianism, but explicitly drawing on a religious framework to justify legal 
authority has ostensibly disappeared from modern jurisprudence as it is read as 
contravening modernity’s commitment to rationality. Therefore, critics of human 
rights and drug policy have queried why drugs have called up the lost spectre of 
theology in law, when other legal treaties escape reliance on such eschatological 
language. Rick Lines highlights that treaties that seek to address historical moral 
crimes such as the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid manage to legislate against the act they seek to suppress 
without describing apartheid as ‘evil’. The same applies to how the 1970 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 1956 Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery or even the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, none of which refer to their respective issues as 
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 Christopher Hobson echoes Lines’ critique in asking why drugs but not 
genocide or slavery summons the spectre of ‘evil’, stating that, ‘among all the 
possible wrongdoing and bad things that exist in the world, it is slightly 
counterintuitive that drugs are the only one to be labelled as “evil” in international 
law’.
30
 The description of drugs as ‘evil’ has a longer historical legacy than the UN 
drug control apparatus. The rhetoric that had been used to drive drug prohibition since 
the turn of the twentieth century, particularly within the United States where the idea 
of drugs as ‘evil’ helped turn what had been a fringe concern of Christian moralists 
into global legal norm. From the reports of early international drug prohibition 
crusader and US Opium Commissioner Dr Hamilton Wright to the writings of 
influential jurist, diplomat and scholar Quincy Wright, the first half of the twentieth 
century saw prohibitionists regularly forward their campaign by characterising drugs 
and drug use as ‘evil’.
31
 The ‘evil’ of drugs is not simply a reference to the potential 
physical harm of addiction, as Jacques Derrida argues, other addictive substances 
such as alcohol and tobacco are not discursively branded with the stigma of existential 
evil.
32
 The conceptualization of drugs as ‘evil’ not only speaks to the religious and 
missionary roots from which international drug prohibition emerged through actors 
such as Bishop Charles Henry Brent and the Reverend Wilbur Crafts, but, I would 
argue, also betrays the extent to which law continues to draw on a conception of the 
universal indebted to the religious, despite the secularised presumptions of UN-era 
international law. Of the various political and juridical projects of the twentieth 
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century, the laws prohibiting drugs draw perhaps the clearest line of continuum to the 
Christian project to capture all the lost souls of the earth, as the early drug wars were 
driven as it was by institutions such as the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union (WWCTU), the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and the Young 
Women’s Christian Association (YWCA).
33
 
To face the task of discerning what form ‘evil’ takes within a godless discourse 
such as modern international law requires us to engage with the tradition of 
scholarship known as political-theology: the study of the way that ‘secularised’ 
political concepts remain indebted to theology. How should we understand evil in the 
‘secular’ world or, as Mark Fisher challenges, what is the content of evil ‘for an age 
that no longer believes in evil’?
34
 A key to decoding this question of evil within the 
Single Convention is to note the placement of evil in the preamble in opposition 
relationally to a universal ‘mankind’. The invocation of ‘mankind’ as being in 
existential danger from drugs provides a telling instance of international law’s 
arrogation of the universal, its claim to speak on behalf of all humanity. Particularly 
following half a century of warfare, post-World War II international law was 
committed to advocating a universal notion of ‘humanity’ shared by all peoples 
equally, turning away from the divisions and hierarchies produced by nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century imperialism. Yet whilst this shift appears unifying, a counter 
narrative can be offered: taking up the task of translating the transcendent office of 
God for a secularised world, German jurist Carl Schmitt adapted Proudhon’s classic 
claim that ‘he who invokes God is trying to cheat’ into the idea that in the modern age, 
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whoever ‘invokes humanity is trying to cheat’.
35
 Schmitt understands the call to 
humanity operating as a deific surrogate. To simply claim application to all humanity, 
as the UN treaties are inclined to do, allows complete circumvention of the more 
crucial question of how the human is produced. Moreover, it ignores the history of 
exclusion that has underwritten the idea of ‘humanity’ and ‘mankind’. As Peter 
Fitzpatrick argues, Europeanised notions of humanity have often facilitated the 
disqualification of people with ‘certain physical characteristics, usually skin colour 
produced from the order of the law’.
36
 International law has been adept at employing 
this exclusionary capacity of the concept of humanity to facilitate the visiting of 
violence upon particular subjects.
37
 This dual character of the category of humanity – 
the capacity to both compel within an all-inclusive humanity and to expel utterly from 
that very same ‘all’ – points towards reading ‘humanity’ as a totalising standard 
against those who are included in a position of exclusion within this global order of 
modernity, those that Martiniquais psychiatrist and canonical postcolonial theorist 
Frantz Fanon would describe as Les Damnés de la terre – the damned of the earth.
38
 
Fanon scholar Lewis Gordon provides guidance towards unpacking the meaning of 
evil in a godless world by seeing Fanon’s ‘damned’ as ‘the theodicy of European 
modernity’.
39
 Through Gordon’s insightful description, there lies a return to the 
classical concept of theodicy: the theological tradition of accounting for the evidential 
problem of evil within God’s omnipotence. While the use of the word ‘evil’ in the 
preamble of the Single Convention has provoked academic questioning, a reading of 
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this seemingly retrogressive and contradictory reference to drugs as ‘evil’ within 
longer traditions of conceptualising ‘evil’ remains under-developed so far. Therefore, 
the relationship between modern, secularised understandings of ‘evil’ and ‘pre-
modern’ religious understandings of the concept must be illuminated.  
 
Augustine and The Evidential Problem of Evil 
To take seriously the task of unpacking the significance of the idea of ‘evil’ within the 
Single Convention, a further understanding of the traditional religious analysis of 
‘evil’ is required. The full history of Christian thought on the concept of evil is, of 
course, extensive and beyond the scope of this chapter to review in its entirety; 
however, a brief engagement can be offered with arguably the most famous 
theological account of evil, that offered by Saint Augustine of Hippo. Drawing on the 
wealth of other Christian theological writings on evil, particularly the Manichaean 
construction of a strict dichotomy in being, Augustine took up the problem of 
theodicy, seeking to explain through his writings how God’s transcendent goodness 
and the self-evident presence of corporeal, worldly evil could be reconciled. The 
problematic that Augustine adopted was one faced by generations of theologians: was 
it beyond of the power of God to simply erase evil contained in the world? If so, then 
how could Christians maintain a claim of God’s omnipotence? Or was evil a 
phenomenon that was included within and existed under God’s totalising will? If this 
was true, then did it not disrupt God’s essential claim towards the good?
40
 
Augustine’s theodicy argued that all that exists comes from God, but once 
existent, it is no longer able to persist in the same state of immutable goodness as its 
creator. A deterioration from the form in which it was created always lies in potential 
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for all that exists, and when something does deteriorate or depart from the form of the 
good as designed by the creator, it is at that point, for Augustine, that we can diagnose 
the emergence of what is then termed ‘evil’.
41
 For Augustine, evil and good are not 
equal relations, instead he perceives evil as dependent upon the contradistinctive 
notion of the good, stating that ‘the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a 
thing that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil’.
42
 
Augustine’s schematic commences from a recognition that, before being made by the 
omnipotence of God, non-being was the state of existence for all creation, therefore 
the denigration of the form from which God made his worldly creations functions 
through the re-emergence of that initial state of non-being into the lived condition of 
being. Evil is always already included within the good in a manner that echoes the 
Platonic understanding of non-being as always already present within being. It is 
through this synthesis of Platonic philosophy and monotheistic Christianity that 
Augustine develops his notion of evil as ‘not a nature but a kind of non-being’.
43
 The 
resulting structure maintains evil as being within the omnipotent good of God, whilst 
still its antagonist. Crucially, for Augustine, evil is not good’s opposite but its 
negation. Evil should not be imagined as an entity in itself as he argues ‘[f]or what is 
that which we call evil but the absence of good?’
44
 Evil does not possess a nature 
itself; it rather better understood as the failed realisation of what should be: the good. 
Evil is merely privation, an explicit lack, in the manner analogous to sickness as the 
absence of health or darkness as the absence of light. For Augustine evil does not 
exist externally to God, therefore God’s omnipotence contains evil while sustaining 
an oppositional relationality to it. Evil is the lack that came before God’s goodness. 
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Augustine’s famous response to the problem of theodicy provides a starting 
point from which to begin to unpack the presence of ‘evil’ in the preamble of the 
Single Convention, which makes a humanistic, secularised claim to ontological 
completeness through an invocation of a universal ‘mankind’, a movement Schmitt 
has warned against as being a cheating claim to totality in the same manner as God 
operates in religious schematics. Having brought the transcendent reference point of 
God into the world itself through modernity’s construction of universal humanity, 
international law mirrors the movement of the Augustinian schema, by placing the 
contradictions of this universal legal order as exterior to the community. However, for 
the law to remain universal, those contradictions, as with evil in theodicy, must also 
be included within the totality. A resultant paralysis befalls those who are deemed 
outside this universal humanity, for they must be utterly excluded by law whilst 
simultaneously being ultimately included. This is the damnation that Fanon speaks to 
when translating the metaphysical structure of theology into the material reality of our 
modern global order. 
 
Fanon and the ‘Theodicy of Modernity’ 
Staying with Fanon, we can assert that his writings offer further understanding of 
what serves as evil in a secularised world, as he describes a paradoxical space that the 
‘damned’ find themselves inside as ‘the zone of non-being’.
45
 This ‘zone of non-
being’, for Fanon, encapsulates the lived experience of the racial/colonised other that 
has long been interpolated as the deformed version of the ideal human. With the idea 
of ‘non-being’ immediately recalling Augustine’s classic description of evil, Fanon 
illustrates how the racial other remains trapped in a condition of privation. Through 
                                                        
45
 Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1991), 2 
 18 
invoking such meta-physical and theological language to describe the experience of 
racialization, Fanon gives indication to philosophical and religious training that is an 
oft-overlooked element of his revolutionary biography.
46
 Even prior of Augustine, 
Christian theology, particularly in the Gospel of John, offered an understanding of 
darkness as symbolic invitation towards non-being and necessary negation of God as 
the way, the truth and the Light.
47
 The echo of Plato’s understanding of the conflict 
between being and non-being, an understanding already influential in Hellenistic 
Judaism, informed John’s easy translation of darkness into the symbolic manifestation 
of evil. Darkness functioned as non-being as it was not created but the failed 
realization of the light, the empty vacuum against which creation existed. Fanon’s 
understanding of racial otherness performs a similar philosophical manoeuvre. For 
Fanon, as a subject, the racial other functions not as a thing itself but as the failed 
realization of what should be: the rational, autonomous, modern (white/European) 
human. It therefore follows that within ‘the totalitarian character of colonial 
exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil’.
48
 The 
racial/colonial other exists only in ‘negation’ and it is through this state of negation 
that it can be seen to function as a surrogate for ‘evil’ within an ostensibly secularised 
world. Fanon provides further theoretical guidance for understanding race as negation 
by describing how within modernity’s structure of being the racial/colonial other ‘is 
the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he is the deforming 
element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is the depository of 
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maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces.’
49
 
Echoing the ‘pre-modern’ the structure of theodicy, the racial subaltern subject cannot 
be wholly other to the universal humanity of international law, lest humanity not be 
truly universal. Yet they cannot be fully human either, as it is a category contrasted 
against their savage characteristics. Therefore, they exist as existential lack within this 
legal order, damned by an invitation to civilise, progress or, in the UN-era, ‘develop’ 
towards a ‘perfect’ state of humanity that is indefinitely deferred and ultimately 
unreachable as it is constructed in opposition to them. Much as Schmitt reminds us of 
the theological operation of God, the modern standard of ‘secularised mankind’ 
functions with a theological undercurrent through claiming its own anti-thesis within 
its totality. The discourse of modernity is exposed as theologically informed when we 
appreciate how, within its Eurocentric logic, the racially subaltern subject takes on 
what Fanon calls, ‘the principle of evil’.
50 
Fanon guides us in appreciating how the 
ontological structure Augustine called upon to account for evil is transformed under 
modernity into the explanation for the racial subaltern subject. For within modernity’s 
universal mankind, the racial other ‘is not a man’.
51
 Instead, Fanon describes how 
under modernity the subject understood as racially inferior ‘represents not only the 
absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the 
enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil’.
52
 Race is used to describe 
the human in privation.  
               The unpacking of the ‘theodicy of modernity’ provides a telling lens 
through which to re-read the curiosity of ‘evil’ being used in the preamble of the 
Single Convention, particularly thinking of its placement in oppositional 
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rationality to a ‘mankind’ in need of protection. The call for the force of law to be 
deployed against drugs in defence of a universal humanity functions not simply as 
a call against the drugs as an entity, but moreover, as a call for the force of law to 
purify from a global order of ‘mankind’ the very subjectivity that these drugs are 
feared to engender: the irrational, savage, insatiable non-human. The discourse 
that supported prohibition has long relied on an image of drugs as these ‘evil’ 
intoxicants, that once ingested can turn the even most reasonable of modern 
human beings into a wild, primitive non-subject, no longer capable of rational 
thought. This narrative has underwritten both the promise and the panic about 
drugs within Euro-modernity. For proponents of drug use such as Baudelaire, 
drugs such as opium and absinthe provoked allusion to the ‘flowers of evil’, 
substances that could aid a desired escape for the imposition of bourgeoisie 
morality towards the pleasures of decadence and eroticism.
53
 As such corporeal 
characteristics- licentiousness, idleness or wildness for instance- were also 
assumed by the same discourse of Euro-modernity to be over-developed within the 
racial other, it allowed for an easy conflation between the two conceptual models 
of ‘drugs’ and ‘race’, or a sense that the two concepts correspond with each other 
in a way the negates production of the ideal human subject. This helps illustrate 
why the popular description of the spectre of the drug addict, the ‘junkie’ maps 
seamlessly onto subject position that has been embodied by the racial other, the 
‘nigger’, the ‘oriental’ etc. As Fanon’s work helps us to see, racism has been 
justified precisely on the basis that particular (non) humans are formed as deviant 
in their subjectivity. Primitive and incapable of rational deliberation, these humans 
are walking examples of a negation of the ideal human subject. This conceptual 
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fallacy is what underlies the translation of certain physical characteristics (skin 
colour, hair type, facial features) into signifiers for this negation. 
 
Drugs, Race and The Long Shadow of Evil 
An appreciation of ‘the theodicy of modernity’ offers potential answers to the 
questions about the use of ‘evil’ in the Single Convention by showing how ‘evil’ 
was understood as a negated form of God’s goodness in pre-modern theological 
thought and how, in the ‘secularised’ modern age, with its new god of ‘mankind’, 
the structure of ‘evil’ marries with the discourse of the racism.  Furthermore, this 
reading also points towards an explanation of the War on Drugs that would explode 
over the later-twentieth century following the signing of the Single Convention and 
that has been critiqued as amongst the most racially discriminatory of modern 
international legal projects.  
It has now been well-established, both within the academic literature and in 
general public discourse that drug prohibition has been racially discriminatory in its 
application. As Michelle Alexander has highlighted, in the United States ‘Black men 
have been admitted to prison on drugs charges at rates of 20 to 50 times that of White 
men’, despite the fact that there is no discernible discrepancy regarding the use, 
supply or production of prohibited substances amongst different racialised groups.
54
 It 
is difficult to contest the claim of Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine that the 
ultimate consequence of the drug war has been not the reduction in drug use or the 
elimination of the drug supply but the production of a ‘bulging prison population […] 
disproportionately comprised of poor people of colo[u]r, most of whom had not 
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 Scholars have taken care to unpack how the US drug 
laws is deeply indebted to that country’s particular history of legal, racialised 
violence; they target in particular structural violence on that nation’s Black population 
through the law. Even before Michelle Alexander’s seminal work, Ira Glasser had 
already named America’s drug laws as that nation’s ‘New Jim Crow.’
56
 The history of 
race has been shown to have played a prominent role as within anti-drug campaigns in 
the U.S.A, from the temperance movements of the early twentieth century to the 
moral panic surrounding the crack epidemic in the 1980s.
57
  
 However, this dynamic is not isolated to the United States. For instance, 
research conducted by notable policy and campaign group Release in the United 
Kingdom has evidenced the extent to which race serves as a key determinant with 
regards to the punishments that are received for breaking the drug laws. In the 
United Kingdom people racialised as Black are disproportionately imprisoned when 
they are convicted as guilty of drug offences, whereas their white counterparts are 
far more likely to receive a simple informal caution for the same drug offence.
58
 
This trend in terms of racial discrimination in the application of drug laws 
continues in Brazil, where drug prohibition has similarly propelled a 
disproportionality in the impact it has had upon Afro-Brazilian and indigenous 
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 Further examples of this trend can be seen in countries such as 
Colombia where the violence of the contemporary cocaine trade can be connected 
to the racialised history of slavery and gold production.
60
 Colombia has often been 
on the frontlines of the international war on drugs and the forced crop eradication 
and aerial fumigation programmes funded by the American commitment to 
international drug prohibition has particularly affected Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities, reinforcing the ‘historic marginalisation’ of these 
communities.
61
 There trend extends across many other nations, with the above 
serving as just a few examples of where drug prohibition has been shown to renew 
racial divisions within the ostensibly postcolonial era.  
 
The Evil of the (non) Human 
An understand of why drugs take on the character of ‘evil’ in this secular age, and 
the way in which ‘evil’ maps onto the negated subjectivity placed on the racial other 
helps us understand why the weight of drug prohibition would consistently fall 
disproportionately on racially oppressed minorities across the world, despite the 
neutral, humanitarian language in which the UN drug conventions are couched. The 
idea of drugs as evil relies on fear of not simply the substances themselves as ‘evil’ 
but a fear of the (non)subjectivity that they can give rise to. The condemnation of 
drugs therefore functions as a stand-in for the fear of the threat of the loss of that 
capacity for civilised humanity, delayed gratification, the defeat of reason and the 
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will at the hand of the appetite.
62
 On a theoretical level, post-war international law 
has been able to facilitate a crusade against such an ‘evil’ in the War on Drugs 
because it has been tasked with the production (and defence) of this universal 
idealised humanity. Human rights scholar Robert Meister captured it best when 
stating that UN-era international law ‘misunderstands itself to be the last 
monotheism because it claims to be the religion of humanity as such’
63
 The equating 
of drugs as a conduit for a denigrated form of humanity, thereby a correlative ‘evil’ 
against the God of ‘mankind’ had become so deep-seated as to have entered into the 
very language of a UN legal treaty, without challenge. Christopher Hobson tells us 
how ‘at the very outset of the conference [that produces the Single Convention] 
drugs were defined in reference to evil, and throughout delegates would regularly 
frame the issue in these terms’.
64
 The jurists, diplomats and national delegates who 
attended the United Nations Conference on Narcotic Drugs in New York, January 
1961 to finalise the draft of the Single Convention would not have been utilizing this 
theological language in isolation from the general proselytizing trend of post-war 
international law and that includes the discourse of human rights, which was always 
already informed by a belief in its powers to save the community of mankind from 
the horrors of the wars that plagued the first-half of the twentieth century. While 
ostensibly secularized, the emergence of the UN human rights framework was also 
indebted to a recalibration by Christianity following the failure of the church to 
restrain the outbreaks of global violence, with both Catholic and Protestant modes of 
religious conservatism instead sliding into European Fascism.
65
 Following a crisis of 
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faith in the power of religion to sustain global order, scholarship has shown how 
post-war human rights can be understood as secularising this Christian imperative to 
save the world from ‘evil’.
66
 As Robert Meister explains, human rights informed by 
an imperative to usher in the world that would exist ‘after evil’, bringing about a new 
community of universal mankind where all peoples are treated and subjectively 
constructed, as the same.
 67
 However, the particular imagination of what constituted a 
universal ‘mankind’ for post war international law, an imagined idealised human that 
conformed to European norms of the modern human subject, would impact upon the 
international drug treaties. The ‘drug’, and the fear of addiction, becomes read as evil 





An understanding of the political-theology that has underwritten the secular concept 
of humanity provides a clue for how drug prohibition has co-existed with human 
rights under UN despite the liberalism of human rights and the authoritarianism of 
drug policy in seeming contradiction. A international legal project that impacts 
disproportionately on racial others in a order to make them civilised can be read as the 
underside of an international project that sought to promote and protect an idealised 
version of humanity. Taken together with the concurrent turn to humanism in 
international law, what scholars have described as the ‘undoubted racism’ of the drug 
laws can be seen as being underwritten by a fear of an uncivilised state of humanity 
that drug use came to symbolise.
69
 This is not to suggest that human rights is an 
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inevitable theoretical complement to drug prohibition. The critique of the modern 
international human rights system is that it was the product of a Eurocentric 
worldview, which allowed it to preach universal humanity whilst sustaining imperial 
inequalities, but this is far from the only possible conception of human rights. Whilst 
human rights may have functioned with a narrow occidental bias as they have 
emerged under the UN, theorists like Fanon drew on the same humanism to map out 
the path towards a ‘new humanity’ following the end of colonial relations, a humanity 
which ‘mobilizes all classes of the people and which expresses their aims and their 
impatience’ but also recognizes ‘the value … of conflict’ that allows those who were 
the victims of historical injustices to free themselves rather than being remade in the 
image of the ideal European. Walter Mignolo echoes Fanon’s call when he argues that 
the twenty-first century calls for a new, decolonised form of human rights, stating: 
Human rights invented the anthropos (the less human) to be 
civilized and defended when the anthropos behave according to 
expectation. That cycle is closed. Now the anthropos is taking and 
becoming the saviour of his/her self and by so doing delinks and 





The chasm that separates the “new humanity” that Fanon called for and the 
humanitarianism remaking the international legal order in the mid to late twentieth 
century is significant. Whilst human rights as they have functioned under the United 
Nations have been critiqued for having the structure of calling for the colonized to 
join a pre-determined western vision of humanity, Fanon challenges the very notion 
of “humanity” in its Euro-modern instantiation and calls for the West to give up on 
the rational, autonomous, ‘civilized’ vision of the idealized human subject to offer 
solidarity not charity to the former colonised peoples. For scholars and activists 
invested in drug law reform, engagement with this cycle of human rights – one that 
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explicitly confronts the echoes of historical injustices of racism and colonization that 
can be perceived not just in drug prohibition but in international law more widely –  
may offer even greater potential than the promise offered by making drug prohibition 
comply with conventional human rights standards. For instance, over and above 
seeing law enforcement engaging in abuses such as indefinite detention or forced crop 
eradication through drug prohibition, a Fanonian humanism integrates these abuses 
with a larger framework of racist police practices and neo-colonial economic and 
security relations. This Fanonian humanism allows for the decoupling of human rights 
from the production of a rational, autonomous and sacred human subject (one that is 
implicitly European) and, by extension, the contradistinction with that savage, 
uncivilized and racialised non-human, the ‘evil’ within the political-theology of 
modernity. 
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